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ABSTRACT
While there have been many calls to use reflection in information systems
(IS) research, the intent of those who linked the word to inquiry, the pragmatists,
seems to be unclear. They suggested that sensory inputs (experiences) are
reflected off specific concepts, either intuitively or explicitly. This paper argues
that it may help to distinguish two types of reflection, ‘intuitive reflection’ and
‘concept reflection’. The former involves reflection without an explicit and
formal process of selecting and considering the concept (idea, stance) that is to
be used to reflect on a past sensory experience. Explicit concept reflection
involves selecting a specific concept against which to reflect. The reflection
literature is revisited using this distinction. Without a clearer understanding of
the pragmatic stance on thinking as re-viewing, the useful pluralist and
emancipatory implications of using reflection are in danger of being missed.
THE PROBLEM STATEMENT
Numerous
researchers
call
for
reflection (Reynolds 1998; Kember et al 1999;
Bjerknes 1992; Mathiassen and Purao 2002)
without making clear what is to be reflected
against what. Are we to reflect our sensory
input against an ideal or are we to reflect
against various conceptions of the world? The
latter is very much the pragmatic intent when
advocating reflection. This specific meaning of
reflection is often not made clear, which
means the powerful pragmatic inquiry method
is not being fully exploited. This paper aims to
re-emphasise the pragmatic intent and use this
to revisit the reflection literature. It will do this

by distinguishing between intuitive reflection
and the explicit use of well defined concepts.

INTUITIVE AND EXPLICIT CONCEPTS
The pragmatist who wrote the most
about reflection is Dewey (1910). He
specifically argues that thinking starts with the
reflection of sensory inputs (experiences)
against some concept (ualisation); a
comparison. Rigorous thinking starts with the
reflection of sensory inputs against explicit
concepts, self-consciously selected. Reflective
thinking suggests a sequence of:
•

The need to make a choice, and the selection
of one option.
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•

•

•

Recollection of experiences related to that
option. These experiences are sensory inputs
from past events, actions, or advice.
Comparison of those experiences
(intuitively or explicitly) against some
concept.
Consideration of the consequences of that
option as highlighted by the particular
concept used.

One of Dewey’s examples involves
choosing whether to take the train, bus or taxi
to get to an appointment across town. He
thinks of one option, say, the train, and selects
the concept of ‘timeliness’ (arriving on time).
He then reflects one against the other to
highlight the consequences (logical sequence
of events) of the option of taking the train. If
that option is problematic he then goes through
the sequence again with another option, say
taking the bus. Interestingly, Polya, in his
famous ‘How To Solve It’ (1945), suggests the
same problem solving method. When stuck on
a maths problem, look for concepts used to
provide solutions to previous problems to see
if any are useful with the new problem.
Notice there are at least two important
elements of this pragmatic act that need to be
mentioned in this paper. The first is having
some experience, be it from everyday work or
from a controlled experiment. The second is
reflecting against a particular concept,
intuitively or in an explicit self-conscious
manner. Pierce (1878) seems to argue there
will be one best concept through which to
reflect, but James (1907/1910) opens up the
idea that the reflection will be more
informative if a comparison were made with a
range of concepts rather than just seeking one
ideal. Using Dewey’s example of thinking
about transport to get across town, past
experiences might have been reflected upon
using concepts like comfort, speed, fun,
novelty or environmentally friendly. These
concepts will suggest different choices of
transport to get to his appointment.
Dewey has obviously had an impact on
information systems through his influence on
Herbert Simon’s and Donald Schon’s work.
However, his specific use of the term
‘reflection’ to explain thinking may have been
underestimated because it would appear that
we can think without using explicit concepts
against which to reflect. For example, we
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CONTRIBUTION
The contribution this paper makes to
the IS community includes:
•

Providing a review of the reflection
literature.

•

Reiterating the pragmatic intent when
using the word ‘reflection’. Given the
pragmatics were one of the main
proponents of reflection, this seems
appropriate.

•

Assisting those undertaking action
research to ensure their reflection uses an
explicit concept.

•

Providing supporting evidence to the
argument that the classification of
reflection into ‘intuitive’ and ‘explicit use
of concepts’ is useful.

would appear to be able to think about, reflect
on, a recent project without needing to first
think about some concept to reflect against.
Dewey’s response would be that this is wrong.
We intuitively use concepts (or parts thereof)
to reflect off when thinking; even though we
may not be aware we are doing it. In the case
of Dewey’s transport problem he may have
‘intuitively’ chosen the concept of ‘timeliness’
over status, comfort or environmental
responsibility. The rigorous thinker is aware of
which concepts he or she is using to reflect.
Intuitive concepts are thought to be
similar to schemas, patterns, mental models, or
automatic thinking as discussed in the
psychological literature (Allport 1954) and
perhaps like a priori as discussed in the
philosophical literature. This subconscious
application of a concept is thought to be so
practised, that we do it without being aware.
However, it is thought possible to make one
aware of one’s subconscious choice. Our
concerns, such as food, status, safety and
friendship, may well provide some intuitive
concepts. Others can be explicitly learnt like
‘environmentally-friendly’,
morality
or
‘project-management’. Language allows us to
be encouraged to use alternative concepts.
As an exercise, may we ask you to
reflect on ‘organisations’. Intuitively you
might think about the experience of your
present place of employment and reflect on it
using concepts of ‘status’, ‘power’ or
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‘change’.
Morgan,
in
‘Images
Of
Organization’ (1986), used a range of explicit
concepts that he, Pepper (1942) and Lakoff
(1993) call conceptual metaphors. These
include reflecting on organisations through the
concepts of ‘machinery’, ‘adaptive organism’,
‘systems’ and others. Their argument is that
using these explicit concepts to reflect opens
many more ideas about organisations. The
wider management literature has used many
other concepts such as core competency,
competitive advantage, irony and strategy, to
reflect on organisations.

Cause of the Act
(a) Why did it happen?
(b) What (instruments) made it happen?
(c) Who made it happen?
(d) With what instruments?

Importantly, pragmatic reflection has a
particular understanding of how decisions are
made (Dewey 1910, chp.6) which differs
significantly from that which might be called
the ‘traditional’ one associated with Herbert
Simon (Newell and Simon 1972; Metcalfe
2005; Gilbert 1991). The traditional one being
that we observe a problem, remain neutral
while collecting evidence in support of
numerous alternative solutions and then we
choose a solution. This would suggest for
explicit concepts reflection, the task becomes
one of appreciating a problem and then
thinking about it using a range of different
concepts until a useful one is found and using
that to make a choice. Rather, Dewey’s
reflective thinking means that, when we
encounter a problem, our intuitive concepts
will immediately suggest a solution. For
example, when told users are not happy with a
particular application, the intuitive concept of
user training may be enacted and the intuitive
solution generated of increased user training.
Rigorous reflection then becomes one of using
a range of explicit concepts to reflect on this
intuitive solution. If this intuitive solution
becomes untenable, then another intuitive
solution will need to take its place and then the
explicit concepts reflection process starts
again. This pragmatic approach to decision
making therefore makes maximum use of
participants’ past experiences as these generate
the intuitive solutions.

These are picked up in the modern
reflection literature by Mezirow (1991). He
reduces them down to three groupings which
he renames as content reflection (what we
did), process reflection (how we did it and
how well we did it) and premise reflection
(why we did it and the consequences).

To emphasise the distinctive approach
of reflection in pragmatism, it may be useful to
compare it to the alternative of Aristotle’s
Causes. He suggests the system of questions
which some readers will associate with
Kipling’s six serving men (Hookins 2005).

Circumstances of the Act
(e) When did it happen?
(f) Where did it happen?
(g) How did it happen, in what manner?
Result of the Act
(h) What Happened?

It could be said that Aristotle’s
questions are calling for reflection. However,
there is a significant difference in emphasis
compared to Dewey’s point about reflecting
off concepts. For example when asking ‘What
happened’, there is no suggestion of what
concept might be used to think about this
question. So using the example of the failure
of the various Ambulance emergency services
computerised systems (Flowers 1996), to ask
the ambulance drivers what happen will get a
different answer from asking the patients, the
hospital administrators and the IT developers
who will give intuitive reflections perhaps
based on their professional training. Each
different answer may well be ‘true’ in its own
right. Further, setting up a research project
asking the same question using the concepts of
leadership, systems evaluation, criminal
activity and compassion will get different
responses again. The same is true of all
Aristotle’s questions. A pragmatist when
asked, “What happened?” should respond, “I
have an intuitive response (reflection) to that
question but what concepts do you want me to
use to reflect further?”

ALTERNATIVE CLASSIFICATIONS OF
REFLECTION
It is being suggested here that it is
useful to distinguish intuitive from explicit
concept reflection to underline the pragmatic
intent when calling for reflection. This
includes Dewey’s view of thinking where all
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thinking involves reflection between our
sensory input (experiences) and some concept.
If the concept is not explicitly appreciated by
the thinker then, if understanding takes place,
an intuitive one from past experiences must
have been provided by our brains. This seems
to assume differing levels of reflective
competence. Some people seem competent
enough to select the concept against which
they reflect, while others reflect against
concepts unawares. This differing ability is
assumed to exist only until people are made
aware that they can select alternative concepts
against which to reflect.
The human cognitive development
researchers, like Piaget (1973) and Bateson
(1973) have studied the development of our
thinking skills during childhood.
Their
research, and other mentioned below, seems to
suggest that intuitive reflection may be present
in children but explicit concepts reflection
comes later in life, taking some years and
effort to develop.
The ability to see some event from
someone else’s view apparently does not start
until aged about seven or eight years.
Arguably, this means the ability to use a range
of concepts through which to reflect takes
much longer for our brain to achieve. The
necessity to lecture on double loop learning in
University courses, and the observation of a
lack of explicit concepts reflection in some
middle aged people, support the argument that
concepts
reflection
not
only
needs
considerable cognitive skill, but it also needs
explicit practice.
Personal experience of
undergraduates’ responses when asked to
compare how different professions might
respond to a complex social problem
reinforced this. The same is true of getting
undergraduates
to
apply
Morgan’s
organisation metaphors to case studies. It can
take some students a while to confine their
reflections to one metaphor. An even more
testing example comes from the experience of
using the ‘random word’ brainstorming
technique. With this, people are given a
random word and asked to use it to reflect on
some problem. For example, someone could
be asked to use the randomly generated word
‘elephant’ to reflect on the problem of
designing an information system. Elephants in
the context of IT make me think of long
memory, cumbersome, family protection of
4

the young, evaluation by being approached by
numerous
‘blind’
people,
destroying
environments and being able to communicate
over long distances outside the human audible
range. The concept ‘elephant’ does seem to
encourage a particular reflective stance.
King and Kitchener (1994) seem to
provide support for the intuitive/explicit
pragmatic divide being argued for in this
paper. They talk in terms of cognitive
competence providing three main stages which
they call
•
•
•

pre-reflective,
quasi-reflective and
reflective judgement.

The quasi reflective stage would appear
to be thinking that includes being able to see
something from other people’s point of view,
to use metaphors and methods like random
word brainstorming. The latter, reflective
judgement stage, is the ability to use explicitly
a series of different concepts to interpret the
same world events. While many people may
achieve this final stage, there is expected to be
a considerable range in people’s skills to
perform these mental tasks. While lining up
with the intent of pragmatic reflection, it does
not emphasise the idea that a mentally
developed person will be reflecting off
concepts (even if only intuitively).
Hatton and Smith (1995) contend that
there are five developmental classifications of
reflection, technical, descriptive, dialogic and
critical, each with its own purpose and
characteristics.
Smyth (1986)
reflection as being:

describes

technical

characterised by the application or
implementation of existing knowledge to
the attainment of given ends. This is
reflection of a technical-rational kind that
culminates in instrumental action. (p. 18)
It does not examine the social context,
in fact, it takes the context for granted
(Kemmis 1985). Technical reflection involves
auditing the existing competencies and skills
to assess their adequacy, in efficient
completion of a given task using a set of given
criteria for success. Hatton and Smith (1995)
maintain that technical reflection is a crucial
aspect for young professionals’ development
and foundation for other forms of reflection.
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Recognition that there are alternative
(re)actions or paths possible to achieve some
goal, and being able to justify the choice of
one constitutes descriptive reflection (Hatton
and Smith 1995). It is called ‘describing’
because of the ability to describe the process
of deciding which action to take. Hatton and
Smith (1995) report that descriptive reflection
is often used by individuals to describe the
context of the situation and the reasons, based
on personal judgement, for taking that action.
It is then used to build the next form of
reflection.
Dialogic
reflection
involves
retrospective analysis of a situation or action,
comparing the action taken with available
alternatives and viewing the action from
different frames. Pee et al (2002, p. 578)
describe it as ‘a form of discourse with one’s
self, mulling over reasons and exploring
alternatives.’ Hatton and Smith (1995, pp. 49)
assert that ‘such reflection is analytical or/and
integrative of factors and perspectives and may
recognise inconsistencies in attempting to
provide rationales and critique’.
Critical reflection ‘involves an analysis
of power and control and an examination of
the taken-for-granteds within which the task of
problem is situated’ (Reynolds 1998). Critical
reflection, considered the highest form of
reflection (Hatton and Smith 1995; Stein 2000;
Knight 1996; Raelin 2001), requires
recognition of events through cultural, social,
political and historical frames. Hatton and
Smith (1995, pp. 35) describe critical
reflection as:
involving moral and ethical criteria,
making judgements about whether
professional activity is equitable, just and
respectful of persons or not. In addition,
critical reflection locates any analysis of
personal action within wider sociohistorical and politico-cultural contexts.
From the intent of pragmatic reflection,
Hatton and Smith (1995) appear to be
suggesting a development through the
concepts being used to reflect. At first the
concepts come from life’s social experiences
from our families and friends particularly
when growing up. Fairness and compassion
are examples. Then some concepts are
provided from scientific or professional
education like measurement, efficiency and

leadership. Then, in adult life, other concepts
are appreciated like justice, equity, respect,
loyalty and democracy. Exactly what order
concepts become available to our minds would
seem to depend on our upbringing and interest
in engaging with the concerns of people
different from ourselves.
Mezirow (1991) points out that the
nature of critical reflection requires there to be
a ‘hiatus’ during which the analysis of one’s
intuitive concepts takes place. Brookfield
(1990) explains critical reflection is comprised
of three stages: firstly, identification of one’s
intuitive concepts; secondly, examination of
those for validity and accuracy; and thirdly,
reforming the concepts, taking into account
issues highlighted in the scrutiny.
Reynolds (1998, pp. 189) asserts that
critical reflection has the following
characteristics that differentiate it from the
other forms of reflection:
•

It is concerned with questioning intuitive
concepts… a process of making evaluations,
often moral ones, and not simply using
concepts of a practical, or technical nature.

•

Its focus is social rather than individual…the
socially situated nature of intuitive concepts
must be taken into account for reflection to
have any meaning.

•

It pays particular attention to the concept of
‘power’. Perhaps the most notable
distinction of critical reflection is in terms of
the attention paid to questioning relations
between power and knowledge and the way
even a person’s intuitive concepts is
inevitably influenced by their position in
hierarchies of power and privilege.

•

It is concerned with the emancipation
concept.

King and Kitchener (1994) argue that
critical reflection is similar to, but not the
same as, reflective judgment. They maintain
that critical reflection requires a set of skills
that can be learned from a limited set concepts
such as power, ethics or emancipation,
whereas reflective judgment requires creative
development of a range of alternative and
relevant concepts. They suggest it is necessary
to work through the other stages of reflection
before the concepts required for reflective
judgment can be appreciated.
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Although Stein (2000, pp. 1) claims
that adults can learn to reflect using critical
concepts if they are taught the processes:
‘assumption analysis, contextual awareness,
imaginative speculation and reflective
scepticism’, he concurs with Hatton and Smith
(1995) that the incidence of critical reflection
in students in their studies and studies of
others is very rare. Hatton and Smith (1995)
found that, despite the methods used to
promote the critical concepts, the majority of
students remain using technical concepts.
Techniques such as action research projects
and journal writing, incorporating questions to
trigger thought processes, have been proven to
be successful in facilitating the explicit use of
these technical and other non critical concepts
for reflection (Hatton and Smith 1994;
Mathiassen and Purao 2002). However, they
argue that specialised skills in the educator and
non-traditional educational processes are
required if critical concepts are to be used with
ease.
Reflection on all levels is recognised as
a learning concept. Critical reflection, with its
focus on cultural, political and historical
concepts, is considered essential to any
information systems education to encourage
developers to adopt inclusive, ethical work
practices (Reynolds 1998; Hatton and Smith
1995). However, the pragmatic intent does
more than encourage use of critical concepts.
It includes making people aware they can use
alternative concepts to appreciate alternative
truths. In this way they can improve the
choices and so improve their lives. For
example, the concept of ‘systems’ enlightened
problem solvers locked into the ‘cause and
effect’ concept.

REFLECTION AND DOUBLE LOOP
LEARNING
The distinction between intuitive and
explicit concepts reflection was made to
overcome the feeling that reflection could be
undertaken without using a concept against
which to reflect. This clarification can now be
used to re-interpret the double loop learning
literature (Argyris and Schon 1996) to provide
further explanation both of double loop
learning and the pragmatic intent of reflection
as always being against concepts.

6

Mention of reflection to most readers
will bring up thoughts of single-loop and
double-loop learning (Jepsen, Mathiassen et al.
1989; Knight 1996; Brockbank and McGill
1998; Williamson and Iliopoulos 2001;
Mathiassen 2002; Mathiassen and Purao 2002;
McGill and Brockbank, 2004). So what is the
relationship between these and the previously
discussed intuitive and concepts reflection? It
is thought that single loop reflection maps onto
intuitive reflection. For example, Argyris and
Schon, (1996) report single-loop reflection in
the management context to mean evaluating
past experiences only in terms of increased
efficiency to reach a short term profit
objective.
Management training makes
consideration of efficiency and effectiveness
intuitive in managers. Another example draws
on Knight's (1996) explanation of single loop
reflection using the question ‘are we doing
things right?’. If this is answered with no
discussion about what is meant by ‘right’ then
only single loop reflection is occurring. Again
it is thought that answering without asking
what is meant by ‘right’ would be an intuitive
answer, using the intuitive concepts of the
respondent. Dooley (1999) uses the example
of a buggy whip manufacturer in the early 21st
century improving his processes in order to
make finer buggy whips. Single loop reflection
is when the manufacturer does not look
beyond his immediate task to take into account
the strategic changes occurring in transport.
After many years making whips, he does not
think through the concept of strategic change,
but rather uses only the intuitive reflection of
whip design efficiencies. Brockbank and
McGill (1998) describe single-loop reflection
in the context of higher education where
perhaps single loop is like trade school
training rather than the critical thinking
required in a university course. Trade school is
expected to teach the students to reflect
intuitively on efficiency and effectiveness,
while a critical education is expected to get
students to question which concepts they are
thinking through.
There is a place for intuitive or single
loop reflection. Knight (1996) argues that on
occasions there is use for this type of reflection
because of a need for ‘developing and
improving the realisation of relatively fixed
goals and objectives’ (Knight 1996, pp. 13).
Courtney et al (1998) describe single loop as
low-level reflection as it involves only keeping
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to a set of rules and is simply error correction,
but it is still viewed as valuable for day-to-day
activities and is necessary for progress to be
made within the established frameworks
(Brockbank and McGill 1998).
Double loop reflection is described by
Argyris and Schon (1996) and Courtney et al.
(1998) as a different type of reflection from
single-loop. It incorporates the first loop with a
second loop. In the language of this paper, this
second loop centres on the evaluation of an
experience using explicit and varied concepts.
It recognises that evaluation of past actions
and the resulting consequences identified
through intuitive concepts alone may not be
valid or extensive enough. Above in Dewey’s
transport example, double loop reflection
involved explicitly identifying concepts like
‘comfort’ and the ‘environment’ and using
these to evaluate the transport alternatives.
Using Flood and Romm’s (1996) questions,
double-loop learning would ask, ‘Are we
doing things right AND are we doing the right
things’. This paper is arguing that, in order to
answer the second question, we need to reflect
through a variety of different concepts.
Mathiassen and Purao (2002) emphasise that
double-loop reflection questions assumptions
and values. Mezirow (1991) and Weber
(2003) maintain that double loop reflection
necessitates taking into account one’s
assumptions, biases and political influences
when considering current beliefs and being
prepared to challenge them, thereby being in a
position to critique or evaluate with an open
mind. Both of these also suggest the need for a
range of concepts to highlight the assumption
inherent in any one concept. The example of
double-loop learning that Dooley (1999) gives
is the occasion in the 1980s when Royal Dutch
Shell delayed its intuitive plans for the
acquisition of new oil fields when it foresaw
the drop in oil prices and the demise of the
Soviet Union. Scenario planning can be seen
as an explicit exercise in shifting intuitive
concepts to alternative explicit ones.
Double loop learning would seem to
suggest ‘standing outside of yourself’, or
seeing the common place in a new light
(Brockbank and McGill 1998). Using explicit
concepts seems an obvious way of doing this
systematically. Examples of explicit frames
include the environment, global forces, and
ethics. Put another way, we can switch from

single loop to double loop by setting up a
series of concepts through which to reflect.
The first move from professional training to
critical education may be to know when and
how to activate this switch from intuitive to
concepts reflection or from single to double
loop learning.
So, in summation, it appears that single
and double loop reflection can be better
explained by referring back to its pragmatic
roots and the distinction between intuitive vs
concepts refection. The advantage of doing so
is to be clearer about distinguishing the two
loops which, given the number of translations
from Argyris and Schon’s original, suggests
still causes problems with practitioners.
Further, using the intuitive vs concepts
language ties this reflection literature in with
the pluralist and multiple perspective
epistemologies and it also re-emphasises one
of the principal intent of pragmatism, that of
emancipating people world through useful
concepts.

REFLECTION IN OR ON ACTION
At the start of this paper, it was
suggested that there is a passage of time after a
sensory experience before reflection and
meaning is assigned. This passage of time may
be a millisecond or many years. Intuitive
reflection suggests a very small time period
between the sensory experience (action) and
the reflection to interpret the sensory input. It
can be easily seen how evolution would select
for this. There would be an advantage in being
able to make a quick response to the sensory
input of a predator. The threat would need to
be very quickly reflected upon using the
concept of predator. When there was some
doubt, it would be better to use the predator
concept intuitively, as the default. Reflection
using explicit concepts seems like a luxury
afforded only to those who can take some time
over reflections. The reflection literature has
long discussed this issue of timing, mentioning
two or perhaps three different time bands. The
mainstream thought is that there are two main
time bands (eg. Schon 1995) called reflectionin-action and reflection-on-action. A third,
prior, time band has been mentioned.
Reflection-in-action is when reflecting
and action take place almost simultaneously.
Raelin (2001) calls it contemporaneous
reflection. Hatton and Smith (1995) and Lee
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and Sabatino (1998) suggest this short time of
reflection, which requires the practitioner to
draw
on
their
knowledge
almost
simultaneously while executing the action, as
difficult if anything but intuitive reflection is
to be used. Schon (1995) suggests that
reflection-in-action is scheduled into work
practices so that it is almost routine and taking
place alongside the work experience. It is
unstructured, spontaneous reflection that takes
place in real time. It is analogous to tacit
knowledge, and single loop learning.
However, when an unusual, unexpected
or complex situation takes place, almost by
definition, intuitive reflection no longer
suffices; there is need to recognise the switch
to using explicit concepts reflection, or
reflection-on-action as Schon calls it. This
necessarily comes distinctively after the action
(Schon 1995; Mathiassen and Purao 2002).
Smyth (1986) argues that technical reflection,
which involves evaluation of the adequacy of
skills and capabilities used for a particular
task, usually takes place immediately after the
event when the consequences are known;
higher levels of reflection take place later.
Smith and Lovat (1995) advise continuing
reflection over a prolonged period of time after
the action to ensure alternatives to the action
taken are fully investigated.
Reflection-on-action is often structured
where actors are ‘coached’ through a series of
activities (Seibert 1999) and learning and
reflection are influenced by peers, supervisors
or educators so that it ‘takes on a social
dimension’ (Jarvinen et al. 2001, p. 288).
Mezirow (1991, pp. 13) explains that this
reflection requires a ‘hiatus’ between action
and reflection ‘to reassess one’s meaning
perspectives and, if necessary, to transform
them.’ It is easy to see how concepts
reflections, perhaps using innovative concepts,
could be systematically applied as reflectionon-action.

Raelin (2001, pp. 19) argues for
anticipatory reflection which occurs prior to
the experience. This is analogous to reflecting
on the future. Dahlborn and Mathiassen
(1995) and Mathiassen (2002) seem to support
this by calling for reflection coming before the
action of developing a new human activity
system. However, our reading of James
(1907/1910) and Dewey (1910) is that it is
impossible to reflect on something that has not
been a past sensory experience. What will
occur is the mind will assume a past sensory
experience which is analogous to the future
project and reflect on what it knows. This is
remindful of the old adage that planning can
only ever be like driving a car by looking
through the mirror; trying to interpret the past
so as to guess at the future. Reflecting on how
analogous past projects are likely to be with
the future, hopefully using a range of
alternative concepts, does however seem
useful.

SUMMATION
This paper has argued for the pragmatic
intent of reflection. Pragmatism popularised
reflection, but it has its own epistemology and
ideology. This seems to have been repressed in
much of the literature on reflection resulting in
an exclusion of the pluralist dimension of
reflecting so central to pragmatism. What is
reflected off alters what is seen. Developing
reflection skills becomes a matter of
developing innovative concepts against which
to reflect. Useful being defined as opening up
alternative actions for people to take to
improve their lives. For systems developers
this means looking for concepts like systems
thinking, critical social theory, e-commerce,
knowledge management, self-organisation and
mobility to think about the action of designing
of useful information systems.
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